Another mental journey into “bet your life” Epistemology -- how we know, what we think we know. Or in this case -- how to act -- or not. There is a “cultural bias” coloring how pilots -- and sometimes regulators & BigGov actors -- bet your life in a decision cycle. A specific historical example below.
Setting, 2002 Europe: Überlingen mid-air collision over Germany between a DHL-611 cargo flight -- and a Russian Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 (BTC-2937). This collision is an excellent illustration of how culture plays into life-and-death decisions.
SHORT VERSION? Mixed cultural reactions in a decision cycle: (a) Folks from "open" societies tend to make "more local" decisions. (b) Folks from authoritarian or totalitarian societies tend to discount their local understanding in favor the "all knowing" authorities. When these two different cultural and social responses to decision cycle are mixed -- it can end very poorly.
VIDEO INTRO: For a well developed background and narrative unfolding of the event -- enjoy this 45 min YouTube video:
45 Min Video: Überlingen Mid-Air Collision
Analysis of Culture Bias upon Pilot Actions and the Bias Upon Situation Awareness:
Both the DHL-611 and BTC-2937 pilots had fully functional aircraft and instruments -- both had access to the same electronic collision avoidance “advice” from the onboard Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).
Cockpit TCAS Panel Indicator (from Wikipedia)
Yet the BTC-2937 Russian pilots had been given conflicting instruction and “advice” from the human Air Traffic Control (ATC) -- a human with access to ground radar. In theory -- pilots in both aircraft -- had "Pilot in Command" discretion to over-ride the ATC erroneous call -- yet the erroneous ATC command was (unfortunately) directed at only the Russian pilot. And here is where a cultural bias afflicts -- and infects -- the “pilot in command” life & death decision cycle.
How so? First a little background to help understand how this cultural bias is inculcated and conditioned into pilot decision makers -- and “plays” against real life decisions.
Back in the mid-1990s -- this author had a USAF fighter pilot describe his experiences in the 1991 Iraq war. This gentleman shared a bit about how the Iraqi "command & control" (C&C) system was specifically knocked out -- early in the war -- to deprive the Iraqis of their ability to consult with -- and receive orders from -- the Iraqi central command. Why? Apparently -- at the US military academies -- the decision cycles -- and the field execution of "orders" -- are carefully studied by the officer corps.
More than just the USA command / execution decision cycle is studied -- but also the decision cycle of many potential adversaries and foreign governments -- the old Sun Tzu adage "Know thyself, know thy enemy."
The Iraqi military were inculcated and conditioned to respond only to the central command. Knocking out Iraqi communications effectively shutdown the Iraqi military's ability to respond. The local commanders were cut off -- and mentally "lost" -- without guidance from their central command.
For follow up, I asked if the US military had a similar C&C knock out vulnerability. My USAF fighter pilot had a surprise -- and detailed answer -- an answer that says much about HOW decision cycles are afflicted -- and infected -- with cultural bias. And how the local decision cycles can be made more robust by the human element -- guys "on the ground."
The USA military learned -- and apparently this lesson is propagated in the US military academies -- that "global planning, local execution" is key to a military campaign. This lesson was especially learned during the 1846-1848 Mexican-American war -- as field commanders were often weeks to months out of contact with the central authority.
1847: 2nd Battle of Tabasco (from Wikipedia)
From cursory historical research -- apparently beginning in 20th century -- the US Military began to collect lessons learned from "global planning, local execution" -- around the nomenclature of "Centralized Planning, Decentralised Execution" (CPDE).
This systemic decision orientation was formalized in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act
For an interesting 2009 summary history -- by Lt. Colonel Hinote -- see "Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution - A Catchphrase in Crisis?"
In simple summary words -- the US military expects the US central planners & authority set the overall “big picture” goals -- and leave the local execution details to local commanders. These local commanders often have access to a more detailed and refined "Fingerspitzengefühl" -- a detailed "finger tip feel" for local situational awareness “picture.”
If the local commanders are “cut off” from their command & control -- they are trained to proceed on their own initiative and local situation understandings -- to effect the “big picture” goals. Apparently -- today in 2015 -- US Military policy tends to default to this “global planning, local execution” mode -- via training and propagation of the military sub-culture -- unless “over-ridden” by political micro-management.
On flip side, apparently the US Military actively takes advantage of many dictatorships and their “top down” government systems. Most of these have “grown up” with fair-to-excellent command & control technology and communications options -- and sometimes lack long term military academic history. These top-down military systems only “know” how to run their combat & war systems by removing local commander discretion and execution -- in favor of "wisdom" from the Jefe Máximo (big boss). Thus the emphasis -- in 1991 -- and possibly in other conflicts -- of the US military to knock out the C&C structure of adversaries.
Back to original topic: How does this “global planning, local execution” mental orientation play into the Überlingen mid-air collision?
Consider the Soviet top-down pilot & military training "atmosphere" -- say from 1918-1992. Please consider -- that in 2002 -- the Russian pilots were mid to late career. This was just 10 years after the break up of the USSR-Soviet Union. This means that much of the early training of the Russian pilots was inculcated and colored by the Soviet orientation -- a centralized, top-down command & control culture. In this top down culture -- a pilot would only career progress by demonstrating a strong proclivity to respond the orders from the central authority -- and pilots would not be trusted with expensive aircraft and significant Soviet state property -- if they failed to instantly respond to this central authority. In simple words, the 2002 pilot's unconscious mental bias was roughly: Central authority knows best for the mission, local details not so much.
TECHNICAL vs CULTURAL DECISION CONFLICT: The DHL-611 pilots responded correctly -- and as per training -- to the “descend” command from the onboard electronic Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).
Panel Display: TCAS EU Flysafe (from Wikipedia)
However, the Russian BTC-2937 pilots had a cockpit decision conflict: The onboard TCAS system correctly commanded “climb” -- to avoid the DHL-611 aircraft -- yet the Russian pilots had been commanded by the human ATC controller to “descend” -- resulting in both aircraft descending into each other -- and mid-air collision.
For a few seconds -- the Russian pilots responded as per ATC instruction -- demonstrating their 1st training instinct and allegiance -- and desire -- to be responsive to the top down, central authority. As characterized in the video -- the Russian pilots were mentally torn and confused by the conflicting ATC vs TCAS collision avoidance commands. The odds are good these few seconds of delay was probably due to the Russian pilots training and cultural bias: Equipment could be ignored with less peril to career, life and liberty -- than ignoring the human command & control.
UPSHOT: For pilot decision makers -- under top down, centralized systems -- like the former Soviet USSR -- ignoring the human chain-of-command was heretical to past training and mental conditioning. This probably contributed much to the Überlingen mid-air collision. The odds are good that there are many other life and death decision cycles -- decision cycles that involve endangerment of people and expensive equipment -- from the size of aircraft -- to whole nation states -- that are colored by past and ongoing top-down training and cultural bias (think and compare with the nuclear Chernobyl Disaster ).
SUMMARY Quote by Steven R Covey -- "We see the world, not as it is -- but as we are" (or as we are conditioned to see the world). And "big" decision makers see the world "as they are" -- just like pilots.
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